A new consciousness has arisen in the scenario of civilian and commercial maritime control: surveillance and safety systems may be under the attack of intentional or unintentional or malevolent players, whose aim (or effect) is to bypass or mystify the control system to obtain economic gain. The advances of mass-price technology, easily sold over the Internet, make this kind of potential events a serious threat that the maritime control has to cope with.TRITON (TRusted vessel Information from Trusted On-board iNstrumentation) is an R&D project that gives some of the possible answers to the threats above, focusing on increasing the trustworthiness of on-board instrumentation used to report vessel information to the control organisms. Today’s maritime surveillance operations rely on ship reporting systems such as AIS (Automatic Identification System), LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) and VMS (Vessel Monitoring System), whose reported data (such as vessel ID, accurate position and time, course over ground, speed over ground, heading, rate of turn, etc.) are typically not verified nor validated in any way.Acknowledging the primary role of GNSS to support these reporting systems, a first objective of the TRITON project is to provide to the on-board unit a “trusted” GNSS-based source of positioning and timing information, robust to some intentional jamming and spoofing attacks. A second objective is to provide to the on-board unit a robust communication transceiver, featuring methods for overcoming the present limitations of the communication standards in maritime field, exploiting UHF “white spaces”.At the end of the project, a proof of concept of the proposed technological solutions will be given in a prototype and appropriate test suites. On top of this, a clear understanding of residual threats will result, based on a comprehensive analysis pursued under different viewpoints: technological, cost-benefits and regulatory.