"The objective of this research project is studying mechanism design problems, where rejection of the mechanism does not end the strategic interaction between the potential participants. These post-rejection interactions will be modeled as a ""default game"" which accepts the potential participants of the mechanism as its ""players."" The existence of this default game has significant effects on mechanism design. How the potential participants would act in the default game after a possible rejection of the mechanism depends on what they have learned about each other during the negotiation of the mechanism. With her choice of the mechanism, the designer regulates the extent of the information to be revealed when this mechanism is rejected. In other words, by offering a mechanism, the designer also determines the nature of the alternative to follow after a possible failure of this mechanism.The preliminary results of the project suggest that the designer may deliberately offer a mechanism which has the potential to be rejected so that the act of rejection carries relevant information about the ""rejecter."" This is in contrast to the standard design setup, where a designer can achieve any feasible goal through mechanisms that are always accepted unanimously.The possibility that the designer may achieve some outcomes only by rejection of her mechanism presents a difficulty in the characterization of what is feasible for the designer. The proposed research aims to develop in the following two directions to overcome this setback:i) Establishing sufficient conditions on the default game under which the rejection of a mechanism is not desirable for the designer.ii) Suggesting a new definition for the term ""mechanism"" which incorporates the negotiation process that often follows the announcement of the mechanism."