This research project aims to better understand the relationship between bank regulation and financial stability. Motivated by theoretical and historical debates about the role of government in the financial sector and the optimal design of bank regulation, this project aims to answer the following questions: What drives financial stability, both on the country and on the bank-level? What are adequate regulatory strategies to minimize the risk of bank fragility without stifling sound and informed risk-taking by banks? What are optimal strategies to resolve weak banks? This project combines theoretical and empirical analysis and different methodologies and aggregation levels. Specifically, using unique cross-country data on bank regulation and bank failures, it will assess the relationship between regulatory approaches and bank stability and efficient bank failure resolution. Motivated by the recent crisis, it will use theoretical modeling to compare different institutional arrangements for a European financial safety net and assess the responses of different countries to failing banks in the 2007 crisis. Finally, using a unique bank-level data set for Germany, it will assess the stability of banks of different ownership types and the factors behind these differences. The research project will combine the use of existing datasets with the construction of new datasets, such as on bank failures around the world.This research will be undertaken with a number of co-authors at different universities (Europe and the U.S.), central banks and international institutions. It will have critical policy implications for the ongoing debate on the redefinition of regulatory frameworks and crisis management tools following the 2007 crisis.